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Two decades ago, Peter Temin proposed with a simple two-sector model to 
expose the logical fallacy in the labor-scarcity thesis.’ If  land is “free,” he 
wrote, then “farmers will find themselves with more land than before, which 
they will use to produce agricultural products. As their workers will have 
more land to work, their productivity will rise. If  their wages do not rise, it 
will pay the farmers to hire more workers. If their wages do rise, more work- 
ers will be attracted to agriculture. These new agricultural workers will come 
from the only other sector of the economy: manufacturing” (Temin 197 1,255 
n. 5). But if  land is “free,” then capital-no  less than labor-will  also be 
attracted to agriculture where its productivity is enhanced by the abundance 
of complementary resources. Thus, free land in  American agriculture “ex- 
plains’’ capital scarcity as well as it “explains” labor scarcity, and therefore 
cannot motivate the capital-using bias in American manufacturing. 
Implicit in Temin’s argument was the assumption that the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors are sufficiently alike to be treated alike, that labor and 
capital will shift between sectors in either direction. Useful as this model was 
for Temin’s purpose, it ignored the central paradox of agriculture, and by ig- 
noring it, alerts us: in the development process resources do not flow symmet- 
rically between sectors; they do not flow into agriculture in response to the 
rising labor productivity achieved there. The response of a developing econ- 
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1. The labor-scarcity thesis holds that the preference for labor-saving machinery in American 
manufacturing “was fundamentally because the remuneration of American industrial labour was 
measured by the rewards and advantages of independent agriculture”  (Habakkuk 1962, 11). 312  Winifred B. Rothenberg 
omy to rising productivity in agriculture-and  uniquely in agriculture-is  an 
exodus of resources from it. It is the paradox of the development process- 
but no less true for being a paradox-that  while rising productivity in agricul- 
ture has been (and with the exception of oil- and mineral-rich countries still 
remains) the key to successful economic development, its function is to make 
possible the sector’s declining output share.* Only growing productivity in 
agriculture can release the resources invested in it to still more productive 
sectors whose growth relative to agriculture is what we mean by  economic 
development. And only growing productivity within agriculture can prevent 
the deleterious health and standard-of-living consequences of  its sectoral de- 
cline. 
The sectoral decline of agriculture in the development process is necessary 
because, alone among the producing sectors in a market economy, the prod- 
ucts of agriculture face implacable price and income inelasticities of demand. 
Expanded agricultural output, whatever its source, causes farm prices to fall 
disproportionately, and the earnings of farmers to lag further and further be- 
hind the growth of output and earnings in the rest of the economy. But should 
agricultural prices remain high because of a failure to achieve the very produc- 
tivity growth that dooms it to falling prices, the short-run advantage the sector 
would experience in its terms of trade would lower real incomes and impede 
real growth in the rest of the economy. It is the combination of productivity 
growth, remorselessly low price and income elasticities of  demand, falling 
prices, worsening terms of trade, and no-better-than-constant returns to scale 
that drives resources out of  agriculture-a  sector that grows, in effect, by 
feeding on its own tail!4 
That process  in  less developed countries today  is  driven, for  better  or 
worse, by  deliberate government policy in the areas of  commodity pricing, 
manpower training, relocation, housing, tariffs and trade, taxation, and sub- 
sidization; but in Massachusetts in the late eighteenth century the arbiter of 
that complex process was the market (Rothenberg 1981). It was the market 
economy that energized the farm sector to achieve labor’s first productivity 
gains (Rothenberg 1988). It was the market economy that presided over the 
shift of resources into the nation’s first industrial sector (Rothenberg 1985). 
The process of  initiating the transformation, of  “getting agriculture mov- 
2. Three-quarters of the twenty-three countries that in the  1970s experienced GDP growth of 
over 5 percent per annum had achieved growth rates in their agricultural sectors of over 3 percent 
per annum. With the exception of  the oil-rich and mineral-based economies, no  more than  2 
percentage points separated the rates of agricultural and GDP growth in the successfully develop- 
ing countries in the 1970s (World Bank 1982,44-45,  cited in Timmer 1988, 1: 277). 
3. The quantity and quality of nutrients (especially proteins) in the diet is being discovered to 
be a good predictor of  height, of  life expectancy at age ten, of the capacity to  work hard and 
protractedly, of resistance to epidemic diseases. Maternal nutrition also plays a major role in 
the birth weight and health of their infants (Fogel 1990; and Goldin and Margo 1989, especially 
370-77). 
4. I owe these very useful insights to C. Peter Timmer (1988,276-331). 313  The Productivity Consequences of Market Integration 
ing,”5 of  kicking the system off  its suboptimal equilibrium, is not easy to 
observe, but once it does begin, the “Smithian” process that relates the extent 
of the market to the division of  labor generates a feedback process that inten- 
sifies the use of inputs, increases output, expands markets, and-most  rele- 
vant of all in premechanized agriculture-enhances  what Moses Abramovitz 
has called “the effectiveness of labor hours” (Abramovitz 1989, 15). The total 
factor productivity growth6 this feedback process made possible may  well 
have “got agriculture moving” in Massachusetts. But how did it begin? 
The trigger may well have been a shift in relative prices: in the late 1770s, 
crop prices, buoyed by wartime demand and inflation, rose more rapidly than 
farm wages for the first time in nearly three decades (figure 7.1).7 Perhaps in 
this environment of rising prices for their products and falling “real” wages, 
farmers could afford to increase their use of underemployed labor services, 
“calling forth and enlisting for development purposes resources and abilities 
that [had lain] hidden,  scattered or badly utilized” (Hirschman 1986, 56). 
They could afford to; the question is, did they? Did Massachusetts farmers 
respond to these market signals, and if so, how and when? 
The motive and the cue for growth are first to be discovered in evidence that 
market outcomes informed the decisions respecting land use, output pricing, 
employment, the investment of  rural savings, livestock holdings, and crop 
mix made individually by the approximately 50,000 farm households in Mas- 
sachusetts in the late eighteenth century.8 Thereafter one looks to find a way 
to measure the productivity consequences of that market penetration. I have 
been attempting for many years to do that, finding in microlevel sources- 
farm account books, daybooks, and probates-evidence  that the end of  the 
5. “Getting agriculture moving” is a phrase that Timmer adopts from a book of that title by 
A. T. Mosher, with the subtitle “Essentials of Development and Modernization” (New York: F’rae- 
ger, 1966). 
6. The growth rate of output can be “decomposed into a portion contributed by  ‘total factor 
input,’ which was the joint contribution of labor and capital (including land), and a portion con- 
tributed by ‘total factor productivity.’ The first was the sum of the growth rates of the factor inputs, 
each weighted by  the share of  its earnings in national income.  The second was the difference 
between the growth rate of output and that of total factor input” (Abramovitz 1989, 14). 
Depending on how this second “residual” portion is measured, it can be made to account for 99 
percent, 70 percent, or 51 percent of the growth of output per worker; or for 36 percent (Edward 
Denison’s estimates for the United States, 1948-79),  or 24 percent of the growth of total output 
(Dale Jorgenson’s estimates) (Abramovitz 1989, 15-19). 
7. I say “inflation,” not “hyperinflation.” The hyperinflation during the Revolutionary War was 
a currency phenomenon in which prices skyrocketed in terms of the overissued and wildly depre- 
ciating paper Continental. But farm accounts, being repositories of long-term debt, were kept not 
in Continentals, but in Lawful Money or Old Tenor-the  latter a paper currency recalled as a 
medium of exchange in  1750 but used by  many farmers long thereafter as a unit of  account. 
Account-book prices and wages were never hyperinflated. 
8. I arrive at this estimate of 50,000 as follows: the surviving records of 38,000 rateable polls 
(nonexempt males age 16 and over) in 1771 are estimated by Bettye Hobbs F’ruitt, editor of the 
1771 tax valuation list, to constitute  two-thirds of the taxable adult males, of which approximately 
90  percent were “engaged in agriculture.” I am deeply indebted to Dr. Pruitt for sharing with me 
the data for her pioneering analysis of the 1771 valuation list. 314  Winifred B. Rothenberg 
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Fig. 7.1  Weighted wage index and price index, 1750-1855  (1795-1805  = 100) 
Notes:  WWI = Rothenberg weighted wage index of crop-related tasks; PI  = Rothenberg farm 
commodity price index. 
Source: Farmers’ account books. The price index appears in Rothenberg (1979,983-85).  The 
wage index appears in Rothenberg (1988, figure 2, appendix 3). 
Revolutionary War ushered in a period of profound economic transformation 
in the rural economy of Massachusetts. Expanding market orientation has not 
only been documented from the behavior of the relevant prices, but was found 
to  have  been  linked  to an  upturn  in  the time  trend  of  labor productivity 
as measured-not  directly (by, say, output per man-day) because data of 
that kind for our period are lacking, but indirectly, by means of the dual, the 
ratio of a Massachusetts farm wage index to a Massachusetts  farm commodity 
price index, which measures the real cost of labor to employing farmers (see 
figure 7.2).9 
But the inquiry should not be left there. For one thing, it matters to the 
9. “Movements of real wages-defining  real wages as money wage rates divided by a cost-of- 
living index-are  not, of course an appropriate indicator of the trend in the marginal physical 
productivity of labor employed in a particular sector or industry. What is relevant, assuming com- 
petitive or consistently imperfect product and labor market conditions, is the real cost of labor to 
employers in the industry under consideration;  real wages received by farm workers could change 
merely as a result of changes in the farmer-employers’ terms of trade with the rest of the economy, 
without any alteration in marginal labor productivity  having taken place. Thus, for the present 
purpose, the relevant wage-deflator is an index of the prices received by farmers for those com- 
modities in whose production hired labor was used” (David 1967, 179-80). 315  The Productivity Consequences of Market Integration 
Fig. 7.2  lkacing the growth of agricultural labor productivity: the real cost- 
of-labor index, 1752-1855 
Notes:  The years 1750 and 1751 were omitted as outliers. The dotted line is the plot of  the 
equation regressing the ratio of  my weighted wage index to my price index on time. 
Source: Farmers’ account books. The indexes, regression equation, and plot appear in 
Rothenberg (1988, appendix 3, table 3, figure 4). 
interpretation of the “real cost of labor index” whether its rise after 1785 is 
due to the rise of the productivity wage in the numerator, or to a decline of the 
commodity price index in the denominator. Even in highly evolved markets, 
structural changes-for  example,  lower transport costs-may  have asym- 
metrical effects (at least in the short run): a significant impact upon farm prices 
but little if  any on farm wages. This would compromise our interpretation of 
movements in the ratio between them. But even more to the point, the ques- 
tion-the  timing of the productivity upturn in preindustrial Massachusetts- 
is of  such critical  importance to estimates of  the pace  of  early American 
economic growth that it should not be left to hang on the dual. If it really 
happened, if Massachusetts farmers-presumably  for the first time-experi- 
enced increasing output per worker, that fact should show up in other behav- 
ioral correlates. 
In this paper I experiment with the use of data aggregated to the town level 
to confirm the turning point observed in figure 7.2, and to make more robust 
the case for the onset of productivity growth in Massachusetts agriculture be- 
fore 1800. On the basis of town tax valuations for the years 1771, 1786, 1792, 316  Winifred B. Rothenberg 
and 1801,’O I advance the following propositions. (1) A significant improve- 
ment in Massachusetts agriculture can be confirmed from expanded output, 
diversification of crop mix, shift in land use, improved per acre yields, and 
increased emphasis on animal husbandry, all by  1800. (2) Growth in this ag- 
riculture was accompanied by the intersectoral shift of capital into commerce, 
banking, and infrastructure investments as required by the development pro- 
cess. (3) Widening differentials in rates of productivity growth exacerbate in- 
come inequalities within the  rural economy,  with  serious political  conse- 
quences. The 1786 tax valuations allow us to understand Shays’s Rebellion in 
these terms. 
The case for increased output and improved yields is made in table 7.1, 
where aggregate magnitudes are compared across tax valuations from 1771 to 
1801. It should be acknowledged at the outset that intertemporal comparisons 
of  tax lists are as problematic as intercensal comparisons. Much of  the 1771 
list has not survived, and part of  what has survived is illegible. Many of the 
categories of taxable wealth are incommensurable across time: in  1786, no 
outputs (except cider) were taxed and consequently none (except cider) were 
enumerated; sheep and goats were counted in 1771, counted but not taxed in 
1786, and not counted in  1792 and 1801, so that total livestock holdings can- 
not be compared across time; the age at which animals became taxable (and 
therefore enumerated), and  the categories into  which  they were grouped, 
changed from valuation to valuation; and differences between valuations re- 
specting the month in which property was assessed will much affect the num- 
ber of  animals found on the farms (Garrison 1987, 5). “Dooming”-that  is, 
underreporting ,  tax evasion, and the systematic downgrading of  land qual- 
ity-although  heavily penalized at the time, was extensive, particularly in the 
valuation for 1786, a depression year. The ubiquity of out-pasturing  from val- 
ley farms to hill towns renders town pasture acreage an understatement and 
therefore overstates its “efficiency.”  The reconfigured map of Massachusetts- 
town boundaries redrawn, lands annexed, new  counties carved out of old, 
new towns “hived off’ from old-makes  intertemporal comparisons of  town 
outputs, town acreages, and therefore town yields, hazardous.  I1 Nevertheless, 
the finding in  table 7.1 that there was considerable improvement in  all the 
magnitudes by 1801 appears robust enough to withstand problems in the data. 
The output of  grains by  1801 was nearly two and a half times what it had 
been only thirty years before. Corn was by far the principal grain, accounting 
for more than 50 percent of grain output.’*  “Rye-n-injun”--com  mixed with 
10. The data are available on request from the author. 
11. Indeed, it is just because working with these valuations is so perilous that data sets built 
from farm account books and probate inventories are so valuable. 
12. Wheat, by contrast, accounted for only 4 percent. Black stem rust, a fungus, parasitic in 
one of its stages on the barberry bush, had appeared in 1660 and had virtually eliminated wheat 
cultivation in Massachusetts  except in the western county of  Berkshire,  where it made up 20 
percent of grain output. Table 7.1  Improvements in Agriculture, 1771-1801 
Date of Tax Valuation 
177 1-1801, 
1771  1792  1801  I  Change 
No. of towns. 
Polls, rateable + unrateableb 
Tillage (acres) 
Combined grains (bushelsy 
Bushels of grain per acre til- 
EnglisNupland mowing 
EnglisNupland hay (tons) 
No. of grazing animals 
Tons English hay per grazing 
animal 
Tons English hay per acre 
mowing 
Fresh meadow plus salt 
marsh (acres) 
Fresh meadow (acres) 
Salt marsh (acres) 
Fresh plus salt hay (tons) 
Tons freswsalt hay per graz- 
ing animal 
Tons freshhalt hay per acre 
meadow 
Pasture (acres) 
No. of cows pasture will 
“keep” 
No. of cows one acre pasture 
can keep 
No. of neat cattled 
No. of horses 
No. of swine 
No. of sheep and goats 






















































































+  85 
+215 
+  24 
+  43 
+  274 
+211 
-  17 
+  152 
+  175 
+  84 
+ 133 
- 
Sources: Town Tax  Valuation Lists,  1771,  1801, Massachusetts State Archives; Felt  1847 for 
1792 data. 
‘In  addition to the 1771 town valuations that did not survive or are illegible, the towns in Maine, 
Cape Cod, Nantucket, and Martha’s Vineyard are omitted from this table, as they are from this 
study as a whole. 
bIncludes  taxable males sixteen to twenty-one years of  age, taxable males twenty-one years of 
age and upward, male polls exempt from tax but not supported by  the town (governor and lieu- 
tenant governor of  Massachusetts, settled ministers, grammar school masters, and officers, fac- 
ulty, students at Harvard), male polls exempt because supported by the town (paupers). Popula- 
tion  is conventionally estimated by  multiplying the number of polls by  four. “Computing the 
polls in the ratio of 4% [is] larger than usual” (Felt 1847,  165). 
cThe  grains are wheat, rye, oats, corn, and barley. 
dNear, from an  Anglo-Saxon  root meaning “to use,”  includes oxen, cows, steers, and bulls. 
However, several of the valuations distinguish between oxen, cows, and neat cattle. In this table 
it is used to mean all bovine animals. 
‘Because the valuations of  1792 and 1801 did not count sheep and goats, I have, for the sake of 
comparability, omitted them from this total in 1771. In  1786, sheep and goats were enumerated 
but were not taxed. 318  Winifred B. Rothenberg 
rye-was  the staple bread of  farm family consumption, but as much as 60 
percent of the corn output in 1800, by my estimate, was used as feed to fatten 
swine and as a supplement for cows in milk.I3 
While grain yields rose over 20 percent between 1771 and 1792, it will be 
observed in table 7.1 that they then fell back about 5 percent between 1792 
and 1801. That drop in grain yields in the 1790s may testify to the depletion 
and predatory “mining” of the soil that foreign observers and agricultural re- 
formers were fond of deploring. But less grain per acre of tillage may testify 
also to a diversification of output away from grains. By the turn of the nine- 
teenth century, Massachusetts farmers had  found many noncereal crops to 
grow on their tilled lands: potatoes, hops, flax, green herbs, celery, rutabaga, 
beets, winter squashes, pumpkins, carrots, parsnips, turnips, cabbages, on- 
ions, tomatoes, asparagus, string beans, green peas; and peaches, pears, rhu- 
barb, new  kinds of apples, strawberries, cherries, damson plums, quinces, 
cranberries, and wine grapes (McMahon 1985). Broomcorn (for brooms) and 
tobacco (for cigar wrappers) became the major agricultural exports of  the 
Connecticut River valley.  l4  Because none of these outputs (with the exception 
of  peas and beans) is enumerated in the tax valuations for the period, their 
quantitative importance remains in doubt, but in view of this diversification 
away from grains it would be an error to make the case for declining crop 
yields on the basis of declining grain yields. 
The improvement between 177  1 and 180  1 in aggregate grain output in table 
7.1 should not be allowed to obscure the high variance among towns in both 
outputs and yields. While aggregate grain output expanded 140 percent, the 
experiences of individual towns varied between a more than fivefold increase 
in Blandford and a more than 50 percent decrease in Springfield. And while 
grain yields statewide increased 14 percent between 1771 and  1801, there 
were fifty towns where they increased far more than that-in  four of  them 
yields more than doubled-but  thirty-three towns where they actually fell, in 
one case to nearly half the 1771 level. Some of that heterogeneity is caught in 
the differences between county-level yields in table 7.2. 
Differential proximity  to  urban  places,  to  waterways,  to  turnpikes-in 
short, to western competition-may  account for the differential pace of diver- 
sification away from grains. It is likely, by  increasing the variance, to have 
13. My estimate of the proportion of corn used up for seed, to fatten swine, and as feed for 
cows in milk is discussed in Rothenberg (1979,989-90). 
14. As early as September 1738, Rev.  Ebenezer Parkman, of Westborough, Massachusetts, 
noted in his diary a shipment of five hundred hogsheads of tobacco being sent down the Connect- 
icut River to the West Indies. By 1860, Massachusetts farmers were growing 3.2 million pounds 
a year, chiefly for the New York market (Clark 1990,294-303).  Tobacco, having become impor- 
tant to the region when the broomcorn bonanza petered out, soon replaced it as the major agricul- 
tural staple of the antebellum period. 
“The growing of broom corn dated from about the year 1800. In  1825 it had become a staple in 
the river towns; in the town of Hadley alone 1  ,OOO  acres were annually planted . . . .  ‘The mode 
of  culture, in the towns on Connecticut river, is very similar to that of Indian corn, hut it is said to 
require two or three times as much labour’ ”  (Bidwell and Falconer 1925,245). 319  The Productivity Consequences  of Market Integration 
Table 7.2  Yields 
Bushels  Tons of  Tons of 
of Grains  English Hay  FresWSalt  Cows Supportable 
perAcre  perAcre  Hay per Acre  per Acre 
County  Date  lillage  Mowing  Meadow/Marsh  Pasture 
All towns 
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Source: Town Tax Valuation Lists, 1771,  1801,  Massachusetts State Archives. 
Note:  The 1771 valuations are disaggregated by name of poll. Town totals for 1771 come from summing 
page totals where given in the original list, and, where those are missing, the totals are taken from the 
calculations made by Bettye Hobbs Pruitt for her compilation of the original data. She did not, however, 
calculate yields for English hay, salt hay, and meadow hay separately, but rather summed all three. The 
hay yields shown in this table are based on the towns for which there were totals in the original docu- 
ment. Because only five Plymouth County town valuations survive from 1771,  there were too few En- 
glish and meadow hay totals to enter. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
moderated the overall improvement of grain agriculture.  l5 But more important 
than new tillage crops in the transformation of Massachusetts agriculture was 
the shift from tillage crops to grasses. Massachusetts farmers were moving 
away from cereals to specialize in hay, and this restructuring was happening 
in advance of significant western competition: long before through-rail service 
between Boston and the Midwest (1853), long before competition from the 
Cincinnati hog markets (1  840s), and even long before the Erie Canal (1  825). 
In fact, the shift, visible in  table 7.1, from grains to grasses, and between 
grasses from the natural to the cultivated, can be observed in the act of  hap- 
pening, as it were, by  1801. While tillage acreage increased 110 percent over 
the period and fresh-meadow and salt-marshI6  acreage (both natural grasses) 
15.  The reader will notice from table 7.  I, for example, that the increase in grain output did not 
quite keep up with the increase in population (estimated as four times the number of polls). 
16.  Salt marsh hay, with phenomenal yields cited of up to ten tons per acre (more probably, two 
tons per acre), is the salt-tolerant grass that grows in coastal wetlands wherever a tidal rise and fall 320  Winifred B. Rothenberg 
increased 122 percent, the acreage in cultivated grasses (English and upland 
mowing) expanded by 173 percent. And English hay, which accounted for 46 
percent of total hay tonnage in 1771, accounted for 53 percent thirty years 
later. 
Hay was always of great significance to the New England economy in three 
respects: as primary input in the production of  dairy products, meat, hides, 
urban livery services, and manure; as primary input in the production of live- 
stock; and as a locally traded output protected from distant competition by its 
bulk and low value relative to bulk. But the grasses native to New England 
offered such poor nutrition that they constrained the expansion of the animal 
stock, and-as  the principal constituent of manure-failed  to enrich the soil. 
The  most  outstanding agricultural reform  between  1750 and  1800 in  the 
northern colonies was the diffusion of English grasses, which were probably 
brought to this shore accidentally, “the seeds buried in the fodder and bedding 
shipped across the Atlantic with the colonists’ cherished livestock” (Stilgoe 
1982, 183). The English grass-called  “herdsgrass” in New  England after 
John Herds, and “timothy” in New York, Maryland, and the Piedmont after 
Timothy Hansen-was  mixed with redtop and clover and broadcast on upland 
meadows (called “mowing”), which careful farmers kept plowed and dressed 
with manure. In farm account books English hay was always twice as valuable 
as native hay’7-selling  for $10 a ton when fresh meadow hay sold for $5- 
and it diffused so rapidly that acreage in English and upland mowing came 
close to tripling in Massachusetts in the thirty years between 1771 and 1801. 
“Long after the first frost turned the native grasses brown . . . the English 
grasses remained true to their old climate and stayed green, providing pastur- 
age into December . . . . [Elverywhere man shaped[  ,I the land was green and 
everywhere he left it untouched it was brown. Herd’s grass or timothy an- 
nounced the coming of civilization, of shaped land” (Stilgoe 1982, 184). 
If  the specialization in cultivated grasses was in fact occurring among the 
generality of Massachusetts farmers, we should see it in a shifting pattern of 
land use: a retreat from tillage and  fresh meadow in favor of  an increasing 
proportion of farm acreage devoted to mowing.I8  From the valuations of  1786 
and 1801, table 7.3 aggregates to the county level the town data on land use 
occurs. The fact that acreage in salt marsh was always taxed at a higher rate than fresh meadow 
suggests that it produces more hay, or perhaps a more valuable hay, although I have been unable 
to discover its nutritional properties. Animals grazing in the marshes or drawing the hay out were 
fitted with large flat “bog shoes.” The hay was thrown onto “staddles” to dry and brought in when 
the marsh iced over in the winter (Smith et al. 1989). 
17. According to Stilgoe, so valuable was the English hay that farmers put their fresh meadow 
hay in the barn and kept the stacks of English hay out in the meadow where they would be pro- 
tected from barn fires lit by lightning (Stilgoe 1982, 184). 
18. Changes in land use are measured in terms of proportion of acreage, not acreage itself, 
because of the constant redrawing of town boundaries and establishing of new towns from parts 
of the old that characterized this period.  Between the valuations of  1786 and  1801, 116 towns 
gained or lost land, and some did both. 321  The Productivity Consequences of Market Integration 
Table 7.3  Acreage by Land Use as a Proportion of Total Acres 
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Source: Calculated from Town Tax Valuation Lists, 1786, 1801, Massachusetts State Archives. 
Note:  The rows do not sum to one hundred because of the omission of “unimproveable” acreage 
from this table. 
as a proportion of total acreage.19 Tillage and fresh meadow decreased as a 
percent of improved acreage in all counties, and mowing increased as a per- 
cent of total. 
That the shift in the crop mix and land use from grains to hay, from tillage 
to grasslands, and from fresh meadows to upland mowing was a shift in the 
direction of higher-valued uses of land is confirmed in a comparison of differ- 
ential tax rates on the several forms of  taxable property (see table 7.4).20 
19. Aggregating to the county level is not only a compact way to handle this large data set, but 
also makes good economic sense.  In many respects the counties are more different from one 
another than are the towns within them, suggesting that they are good proxies for regions. Coun- 
ties differed markedly in the proportions of wheat, rye, corn, oats, and barley in their grain output; 
in indexes of commercialization; and, of course, in the presence salt marsh. 
The valuation of  1771 had to be omitted from table 7.3 because it did not count “woodland and 
unimproved or “unimproveable” acres. “Unimproved’ and “unimproveable” acres were counted 
in both 1786 and 1801. In table 7.3 I have not included “unimproveable” lands-much  of which 
is land under water-in  the total acres, and hence the rows do not sum to 100 percent. Thus, in 
table 7.3 “total”  = tillage  + English and upland mowing  + fresh meadow  + salt marsh  + 
pasture + woodland and unimproved. 
20. The valuation of 1771 had to be omitted from table 7.4 because it contains no tax rates. 
The absolute level of tax rates bears no obvious relation to land values, but their levels relative 
to one another are suggestive. According to Harold Hitchings Burbank, the procedure for deter- 
mining how the state direct tax should be apportioned among the towns was first to calculate the 
poll tax at one penny or ha’penny (Id or Yd.)  per rateable poll, and then each town was compared 
to other towns with regard to real and personal property to determine how much should be added 
to each town’s poll tax to fill its equitable share of the revenue sought from the tax. A town judged 322  Winifred B. Rothenberg 
able  7.4 
County  Date  Tillage  Mowing  Meadows  Pasture 




































































































Source: Calculated from Town Tax Valuation Lists, 1786, 1801, Massachusetts State Archives. 
While the tax rate on tillage in all towns declined between 1786 and 1801, the 
rates on all grasslands-on  mowing, meadow, marsh, and pasture-rose;  and 
mowing was taxed in each town as the most highly valued use of land.*’ 
If  agricultural improvement  dictated  a  shift  from  native  to  cultivated 
grasses, we should also see a retreat from pasture-of  all cleared acreage on 
Massachusetts farms, the most hilly, rocky, swampy, overgrown, “impover- 
ished and skinned” (Bidwell and Falconer 1925, 102). Yet,  for the state as a 
whole, acreage in pasture between 1771 and 1801 increased more than any of 
the other barometers we have been tracking, and increased as a proportion of 
to be  poor would derive more  of  its quota from the tax on polls than from the tax on property. 
Assessors in each town were instructed to come up with the full quota, but there was considerable 
room for discretion, for not all property was taxed and rates were seldom if ever assessed on full 
value. Even during the period when the law required full valuation-1777-81-the  practice of 
30-40  percent underassessing continued. The authority on this is still Burbank (1915). Pages 90- 
235 of this dissertation are available in typescript in the Massachusetts State Library, State House, 
Boston. 
21. “Woodland and unimproved lands” paid increased taxes as well. It was  the only land use 
taxed on an ad  valorem basis-at  2 percent of  market value. The increased burden of  taxes on 
woodland came from a dramatic 37 percent rise in the market value of  woodlands between 1786 
and 1801. 
Of course, to measure the real burden of rising per acre tax rates over time, comparisons should 
be made in constant dollars. According to my  farm price index, there was a 21 percent increase in 
the level of farm-gate prices between 1786 and 1801. Thus, many of these tax rates increased less 
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both improved and total farm acreage in most counties. There are several pos- 
sible explanations for the expansion of pasture. First, keeping land in pasture 
for anywhere from three to seven years was a way to fallow tillage in rotation 
after two or three crops had been taken off, and to the extent that this was true, 
the increase in pasture would signal more careful husbandry-that  is, more 
land in rotation-not  less. Second, by  1801 the number of  grazing animals 
(cattle, oxen, and horses) was more than two and a half times what it had been 
in 1771, and larger herds required more summer pasture even if considerable 
efforts were being made to stable and stall-feed animals for the rest of the year. 
But these benign explanations for increased pasture acres fall before the 
farmers’ own judgments concerning the quality of their pasture lands. Be- 
tween 1771 and 1801 there was a 17 percent decline in the number of cows 
per acre that farmers reckoned their pasture “will keep”-a  subjective but 
important measure. Whatever improvement in the carrying capacity of an acre 
of pasture had been realized between 1771 and 1792 was more than offset by 
the decline in its carrying capacity between 1792 and  1801 (see table 7.1). 
Pasture acreage had increased because pasture quality had unquestionably de- 
teriorated, so that by  1800 more land was  required to support each grazing 
animal.  22 
For the average farmer to have attempted to reclaim this, the uncultivated, 
overgrazed, exhausted 20 to 40 percent of his land,23  would have required, at 
the very least, intensive manuring. Cattle can be viewed as curious machines: 
“they are the best machine for turning herbage into money” (Massachusetts 
Society for Promoting Agriculture [MSPA] Papers, 1807, 48), yes, but even 
more importantly, they turn herbage into manure. Each cow  or ox that is 
stabled all winter consumes in that time two tons of hay from which it pro- 
duces two loads of manure (at thirty bushels a load), and an additional load if 
yarded at night during the summer.24  At thirty loads to the acre (the rate often 
cited for manuring tillage and mowing), it would have taken ten cows eating 
three tons of hay apiece for a year to manure one acre!25  There were horses, 
swine, chickens, and  sheep to help, of  course, and there were nonanimal 
sources of fertilizers, but with over 2,800 acres of pasture in the average Mas- 
sachusetts town in  1801, the effort was formidable. Small wonder that one 
farmer from the hill country protested to the MSPA: “If you have rocky pas- 
22. Perhaps “required” is an exaggeration. In a multiple regression analysis in which the depen- 
dent variable was “number of cattle owned in  131 towns in the  1771 valuations, Bettye Hobbs 
Pruitt found that while “tons of hay” explained 89 percent of the variation of the dependent vari- 
able, the introduction of the variable “acres of pasture” increased the explanatory power of  the 
regression by a mere 0.3  percent (Pruitt 1981, 183). 
23. Bidwell goes so  far as to  say that the distinction the valuations made between pasture and 
woodlands-that  is, between pasture and unimproved-“was  probably not of great importance” 
(Bidwell and Falconer 1925, 120). 
24. MSPA Papers, 1800-1807,  responses to  their “Inquiry” of 1800, questions 38-44. 
25. In the  1790s, Dr.  Nathaniel Ames of Dedham, brother of Fisher Ames, spread 400 loads of 
manure per acre (at thirty bushels, or one yard cubed, to the load) to cover the soil three inches 
deep! His memorandum book is at the Dedham Historical Society. 324  Winifred B. Rothenberg 
ture, to subdue it would cost the whole value of the farm . . . .  It makes no 
sense to cultivate [it] till our country shall count as China does its 270 million 
souls .” 26 
Fortunately, improved animal husbandry in Massachusetts did not need to 
wait upon the reclamation of depleted pasturelands. The combination of sum- 
mer out-pasturing in the hill country and stall feeding the rest of the year on 
corn and English hays, whose yields per grazing animal were rising, proved 
sufficient, even with inferior pastures, to support a very large increase in graz- 
ing stock. (Table 7.1 confirms both assertions.) 
And it did more: livestock were increasing both in number and in weight, 
and the “edible weight” of hogs and beef cattle had a direct bearing upon the 
nutrition, health, and standard of living of the human population.27  From farm 
account books and probate inventories I have collected 385 hog weights from 
1750-1850.  Standardizing slaughter and dressed weights to a live-weight ba- 
sis,28  the twenty-six observations that I found before  1800 averaged 164.5 
pounds; the next twenty-six observations, from 1800 to 1816, averaged 287.3 
pounds. The first 400-pound hogs appeared in 1801. 
If  it is indeed the case that “grain supplies offer clearer evidence of  meat 
production capacity than do . . . animal inventories” (Gallman 1970, 18),29 
and if the weight gains in my small sample are representative, it suggests that 
we err in modeling grains and livestock, corn and hay, tillage and mowing as 
if they were substitute uses of resources. Animal husbandry is a thickly tex- 
26. New England  Farmer, August 3, 1822. 
27. “[A]mericans achieved an average level of meat consumption by  the middle of the eigh- 
teenth century that was not achieved in Europe until well into the twentieth century . . . .  Ameri- 
cans achieved modern heights by the middle of the eighteenth century [and] reached levels of life 
expectancy that were not attained by the general population of  England or even by  the British 
peerage until the first quarter of the twentieth century” (Fogel 1990, 36). Fogel cites as his evi- 
dence of Americans’ meat consumption Sarah F.  McMahon’s study of widows’ portions in Mas- 
sachusetts wills (McMahon 1981, 4-21).  It is Massuchuserrs farmers who achieved this level of 
meat consumption. 
28. I describe in Rothenberg (1981, 306) how I converted the sample of adult hog weights to 
live weights. For the convenience of the reader, I will repeat it here. In each case a determination 
had to be made as to whether the weight given in the farm account books was a live or dressed 
weight, and there are few clues in the sources themselves. I compared the per pound price of the 
hog (usually given) with the per pound price of fresh pork for that region in that year. If  the per 
pound price of  the hog was less than the price of fresh pork, the weight was called a live weight. 
If the per pound price of the hog equaled or exceeded the price of fresh pork, the weight was called 
dressed weight and divided by 0.70 to standardize all weights to live weights. The dressed weight/ 
live weight ratio of 0.70 was chosen because it lies midway between the figure of 0.75 (or 0.76 
used by some authorities)  and 0.65 used by others. 
At the time these calculations were being done, I assumed that dressed weight was the proper 
measure of the accessible nutriments in meat. Apparently there is still another correction to be 
made: to multiply dressed weight by 0.64 to reduce it to “edible weight” (Fogel 1990,53  n.  14). 
29. In Massachusetts it was not only grain supplies but skimmed milk, root crops, and legumes 
in animal feeds that determined meat production. As a consequence (presumably),  Massachusetts 
hogs, fattened for one month, weighed more in 1800  than southern hogs, fattened for four months, 
weighed in 1860. The average live weight of Massachusetts hogs, calculated from probate inven- 
tory  appraisals, was 224 pounds in  1780-1805;  the average live weight of  southern hogs,  as 
estimated by Gallman, was 192 pounds in 1860 (Gallman 1970, 15). 325  The Productivity Consequences of  Market Integration 
tured web of complementarities made possible only by  the increased yields 
achieved in  tillage agriculture, which in turn is made possible only by  the 
continuous improvement of  manure  achieved in  animal husbandry. Corn, 
small grains, root crops, and legumes grown on richly manured soils were 
both consumption goods and intermediate products that along with nutritious 
grasses produced rich manures, fat cattle, dairy products, meats, hides, wool, 
energy, and the natural increase of  animals after their kind. In addition to 
grasses, animals used every part of the cereal plants: the grains for feed, the 
straw and stover for fodder and for bedding; the stubble for forage, and what 
was not consumed by  grazing livestock as “after-feed” was composted into 
“green manure” to augment animal manure. The process was profoundly cir- 
cular. 
A circular process was transformed into a growth process. It took the form 
of  better management of livestock, manures, woodlots, fruit orchards, culti- 
vated meadows, seed selection, stall feeding, and dairying. Legumes and root 
crops were both nutritious in feeds and nitrogen-fixing in rotation. Land clear- 
ing, fencing, and connecting farm buildings were part of the restructuring of 
farm space. None of these improvements required more capital, but all called 
for more labor inputs, more effective labor hours, the application of  know- 
how learned by doing, and the reorganization of farm work. If, in the course 
of the development process, agriculture’s share of the labor force goes down, 
then an increase in agricultural output per capita can be achieved only by  a 
very great increase in agricultural output per agricultural workel:  30  Where is 
that increase to come from if, as late as the  184Os, there was virtually no 
capital deepening-that  is, no technological change-in  New England agri- 
culture? From endogenously generated intensification in the use of labor. “La- 
bor is the great thing in farming” (Larkin, 1989). 
Lacking the kind of task- and crop-specific evidence of  man-hour inputs 
that Parker and Klein (1966) and Atack and Bateman (1984, 1987) have col- 
lected for a later period, it is difficult to determine how the agricultural im- 
provement visible in tables 7.1 and 7.2  was being achieved. But conspicuous 
among the techniques available to Massachusetts farmers to manage produc- 
tivity growth was the employment of farm laborers (who usually lodged with 
the family) to do general farm work on monthly contract.31  Workers paid a flat 
monthly wage for the duration of a long-term contract were accepting an im- 
plicit wage below the marginal productivity wage they might have negotiated 
30. Paul David’s “conjectural estimating equation” to measure growth in a two-sector economy 
is O/P = LF/P X  [Sa(O/LF)a  + S,  X  R(O/LF),],  where O/P  is output per capita,  LF/P is the labor 
force participation rate, So is the share of the labor force in agriculture, S, is the share of the labor 
force in nonagriculture, both of which are weights on sectoral output per worker, and k is the ratio 
of the sectoral outputs per worker in the base year. 
31. For a fuller discussion of the employment of contract labor in Massachusetts agriculture, 
1750-1865,  see Rothenberg (1992). 326  Winifred B. Rothenberg 
on a day-labor basis in season, in return for room, board, and an implicit wage 
above the value of their marginal product in the off-season (Lebergott 1964, 
245; Goldin and Engerman 1991, 7, and table 2). Employing farmers, faced 
after the Revolution with wage competition from an increasingly integrated 
labor market, would have seen in the reorganization of farm labor an oppor- 
tunity to hoard scarce labor, to minimize search costs, to hedge against the 
rising  and increasingly differentiated wage  structure that was  emerging at 
the end of the eighteenth century (Rothenberg 1988, figure l),  and to increase 
the effectiveness with which labor was used. 
Slavery and serfdom aside, the options available to farmers wherever wage 
labor is scarce are the same: cash tenancy, sharecropping, a cottager system, 
or labor contracts. Of these, Massachusetts farmers came increasingly to rely 
on labor contracts. I report briefly here on a larger study (Rothenberg 1992). 
The principal data come from a sample of 693 monthly contracts I have drawn 
from forty farm account books for the period 1750 to 1865. They are supple- 
mented by  a data base of 210 contract workers hired, beginning in  1787, to 
work on the Ward Farm in Shrewsbury, Massa~husetts.~~ 
Monthly contracts appeared in farm account books early in the eighteenth 
century,33  but there was a threefold increase over time in their incidence, from 
an average of thirteen contracts per quinquennium before 1800 to an average 
of over fifty per quinquennium after 1800. The most rapid increase began at 
our “turning point,” 1785: by  1814 the number of contracts per five-year pe- 
riod had soared from seven to seventy-three. That the acceleration in the use 
of  monthly labor occurred at about the same time as the acceleration in the 
growth of labor productivity compels us to examine what relation may have 
existed between them. What role, if any, might this reorganization of the farm 
labor force have played in increasing total factor productivity? 
The most obvious advantage of labor under contract is that it lessens search 
time (transactions costs) for both parties. Less obvious and more complicated 
is the impact of monthly labor contracts on seasonality in agriculture. To  the 
extent that a live-in “hired hand” is (for the term of  his contract) a piece of 
fixed capital-like  a slave-the  farmer’s challenge is to keep him fully occu- 
pied. New England agriculture, which is so profoundly seasonal, would seem 
for that reason to be as unlikely a setting for a long-term contract as it was for 
slavery, and for some of the same reasons: an idle live-in worker was  “an 
under-utilized asset which nonetheless required maintenance” (Anderson and 
Gallman 1977, 25). A surly young man of  unknown family sleeping under 
32. The Ward data base was compiled at Old Sturbridge Village under the direction of Jack 
Larkin, chief historian, in the Research Department, and generously made available to me by him. 
33. The first agreement for monthly labor that I have found was in Boxford, Massachusetts, in 
1713. Rev. Ebenezer Parkman of Westborough hired live-in labor on six-month contracts begin- 
ning in 1726 (Beales 1989). Joseph Barnard of Deerfield began regularly to hire monthly workers 
in 1753. In addition to Beales’s study of  Parkman’s hired hands and Larkin’s study of the Wards’ 
farm laborers, volume 99 of the Proceedings  of the American Antiquarian Society also contains 
Richard Lyman’s study of workers on the Levi Lincoln farm in Oakham, Massachusetts. 327  The Productivity Consequences of Market Integration 
your roof, eating (ravenously) at your table, wheedling to use your horse and 
to borrow cash against his wages, requiring of your wife that his clothes be 
washed and mended, posing a constant threat to your daughter, and expecting 
at the end of his term to be paid in full is a powerful incentive to organize your 
farm so that he is worked hard and continu~usly.~~ 
If, despite the inexorable seasonalities of  northern agriculture, Massachu- 
setts farms were sufficiently diversified to employ a “fixed labor force for 
much of the year, it would follow from the Anderson and Gallman argument 
that contract labor on Massachusetts farms, like slave labor on southern plan- 
tations, may have worked to enhance the productivity of the enterprise by 
compelling the reorganization of farm work to secure its year-round employ- 
ment. Tho kinds of evidence might be helpful here: Was there an increase in 
the length of labor contracts over time? Was there an increase in the frequency 
of  off-season (winter) contracts, regardless of their length? 
There is little evidence in my sample of any time trend in the average length 
of contracts. Although more than 10 percent of the contracts were for periods 
of nine to twelve months, there were only nine years when the average man- 
months per contract exceeded seven. This may speak to seasonalities in New 
England farming that resist efforts at distributing  work more evenly across the 
year. Or it may have quite different implications. 
Despite the obvious advantages of fixing a labor force in place, employing 
farmers may have been reluctant to lock themselves into lengthy and intimate 
commitments to unreliable men, strangers to the community, frequently ab- 
sent, frequently drunk, and frequently quitters. Genealogical linking, by re- 
searchers at Old Sturbridge Village, of  the sample of 210 farm laborers who 
worked on the Ward Farm in Shrewsbury reveals the following: half the day 
workers but only one-quarter of the contract workers were born in Shrews- 
bury; the average age of day laborers was 41.6 years, while the average age of 
contract workers was only 26.5 years; over 80 percent of the day workers were 
married, while over 86 percent of the contract workers were unmarried; the 
proportion of  contract workers born abroad (England and Scotland at first, 
Ireland and French Canada after  1830) was  more than double that of  day 
workers. 
I am suggesting that the qualify of the agricultural labor supply-or  the 
34. I am put in mind, as they say, of  an entry in Ebenezer Parkman’s diary. On June 2, 1739, he 
was told of the “Rude and Vile conduct of John Kidney [his indentured servant] towards my Dauter 
Molly.” (Molly-real  name Mary-was  fourteen at the time). Kidney had “button’d the Door and 
assaulted and Striven with her, thrown her on the Ground and was very indecent towards her, Yet 
was not suffer’d to hurt her-except  what was by the Fright and bruising her arms in struggling 
with her. When disengag’d She ran out to go to her uncles, but he ran  after her and forc’d her back 
and made her wash the Blood from her arms.” John made promises but two weeks later was 
discovered to have stolen Mrs. Parkman’s comb; he put on his best stockings to cut bushes in, and 
continued to exhibit “his Stubborn Stomach.” Parkman threatened to send him to the house of 
correction, but in the end “accepted Johns Humiliation on his Knees with flowing Tears,’’ and sold 
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perception of their quality-may  have deteriorated as a consequence of labor 
market integrati~n,~~  creating not only a dual labor market in agriculture (at 
least in the short run),36  but, increasingly over time, one that operated per- 
ver~ely.’~  Casual (part-time) day work was being done by  stable men with 
roots in the community-kin,  neighbors, and the sons of neighbors-while 
steady work on contract was, to a greater and greater extent, being done by 
casual  men:  transients,  migrants,  passersby  who  “come  here  to  work,” 
hired-quite  literally in the case of the Wards-off  the road (Larkin 1989, 
197). Agreements  frequently began  cautiously, conditionally-“if  he  live 
with me a year,” “no stated time agreed upon to stay,” “if I want so long,” “if 
we like,” “if he is faithful and learns to work well”-with  the starting wage to 
be raised if things worked out. The employing farmers were justifiably wary 
of long contracts; the record is strewn with sudden quits.’* 
Even if the average length of labor contracts in my  sample did not increase 
to span the seasons, short-term contracts would have worked to offset season- 
ality if an increasing proportion of them were for off-season work. The num- 
ber of  winter contracts increased markedly from 4 in 1750s to 143 between 
1800 and 1809. Overall, 24 percent of the man-months under contract in my 
sample were for winter work. Granted that no task made the manpower de- 
mands that haying did, farm work in Massachusetts was sufficiently varied to 
be almost a year-round enterprise. And to the extent that there was double- 
35. It will be recalled from the Davis-Gallman-Hutchins  project on whaling that whaling, too, 
suffered after 1820 from the deterioration in the quality of  crews when alternatives ashore became 
more attractive. They estimate that productivity in whaling fell 0.3 points between 1820 and 1860 
as a consequence of a 52 point increase in wages ashore (Davis, Gallman, and Hutchins 1989, 
136). 
36. I do not intend, by the use of the term “dual labor market,” to engage in a political contro- 
versy over whether the market for rural labor “worked,” in the neoclassical sense. After all, unlike 
race, ethnicity, gender, and educational deficits, the contract workers who were too young, too 
single, too uprooted, and too Irish would in time become as old, as married, and (even if not as 
rooted) as “American” as more respected workers. Nevertheless, in the short run they were iden- 
tifiable as having limited options. 
37. Dual labor market theory distinguishes between primary and secondary labor markets. A 
primary labor market is “composed of jobs . . . which tend to be better jobs-higher  paying, 
more promotion possibilities, better working conditions, and more stable work. The secondary 
labor market . . . contains the low-paid jobs that are held by  workers who are discriminated 
against and who have unstable working patterns” (Cain 1976, 1222). 
“There are distinctions  between workers in the two sectors which pamllel those between jobs” 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971,65;  emphasis mine). In calling the market for rural labor “perverse,”  I 
wish to make the point that with respect to the steadiness of  the work, the distinctions between 
workers in the two sectors (that is, between daily and monthly laborers) did not parallel those 
between the jobs. 
38. The word contract is being used loosely throughout this section. What I am calling a con- 
tract is an entry in the employing farmer’s account book or diary. (I have found only one instance 
when both the farmer and the worker signed their agreement.) The fact that over 10 percent of my 
sample contracts were terminated by worker quits would suggest that these arrangements  were not 
legally binding. On the other hand, those state courts that denied relief to workers who sued for 
wages withheld when they quit took these agreements to be express contracts that barred an action 
on quantum meruir. For a debate on the judicial treatment of farm contracts in the early nineteenth 
century, contrast Honvitz (1977) and Karsten (1990). 329  The Productivity Consequences of Market Integration 
cropping of winter rye and winter wheat-sown  after the harvest in August 
and reaped in the spring-even  grain farms needed labor “off-season.” 
Increments to the quantity and quality of factors of production will produce 
growth, but only structural change effects the transformation we call develop- 
ment, and it is structural change, more than mere growth, that distinguished 
the antebellum New England economy from all other regions in the country. 
Among the most important structural changes that take place in an agricultural 
economy is the shift of resources to sectors with economies of, and increasing 
returns to, scale. If  these can seldom if  ever be realized within the physical 
plant of a New England farm, we should look for signs of a shift of resources 
out of farming. 
To  seek evidence of developmental structural change within the limited cat- 
egories of taxable property, we will judge those towns to be developing most 
rapidly where the agricultural sector bears a diminishing proportion, and non- 
agricultural property an increasing proportion, of the total tax burden.39 
As early as 1647, the General Court authorized taxation not only on polls 
and real estate, but on the income from “mils, ships and all smaller vessels, 
merchantable goods, cranes, wharfes, and all sorts of cattell and all other 
visible estate” (Felt 1847, 237). In  1771, the state taxed (and therefore the 
valuations enumerated) shops, tanneries, slaughterhouses, pot- and pearl-ash 
works, warehouses, vessel tonnage, wharf footage, ironworks, bake houses, 
distilleries, sugar houses, gristmills, sawmills, slitting mills, fulling mills, 
stock in trade (goods in process and merchandise inventories), and money at 
interest (net of debts on interest). In 1786, money on hand (including bank 
deposits) and debts were added and taxed at 6 percent; and in  1801, annual 
income from holdings of U.S. and state securities, bank stock, and shares in 
bridges, toll roads, and turnpikes were added and taxed at 6 percent. 
The expansion of the nonagricultural sector can be inferred from table 7.5, 
which shows that in all counties agricultural property, averaged across towns, 
paid a decreasing share-and  nonagricultural property an increasing share- 
of taxes.4o  Within counties, the variance among towns in the same years, and 
for the same towns between years, is striking. Even excluding Salem and Bos- 
ton, the range in  1786 extended from towns where agriculture paid over 90 
percent of total taxes, to towns where agriculture paid less than  4 percent. 
While the range did not appreciably narrow by  1801, individual towns expe- 
rienced the retreat of  agriculture. The agricultural sector in Freetown (Bristol 
39. By agriculture’s share of the tax burden, I mean the share of each town’s total tax liability 
accounted for by the taxes on acres of tillage, mowing, meadow, marsh, pasture, woodlands, and 
head of livestock. Cider was not included because, although it had been enumerated in all three 
valuations, it was not taxed in 1801 and hence had no tax rate in  1801. 
40. Because the  1771 valuation list does not include tax rates at  all, we can only trace the 
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Table 7.5  Taxes on  Agriculture as a Percentage of Total Taxes 
Range 
~~~ 
County  Date  Mean  Highest  Lowest 
All towns.  1786  .74 (.14) 
1801  .66 (.13) 
Hampshire  1786  .78 (.09)  .90 (Heath)  .55 (Springfield) 
1801  .71 (.07)  .89 (Shelburne)  SO  (Springfield) 
Worcester  1786  .75 (.09)  .85 (Hubbardston)  .57 (Worcester) 
1801  .69 (.05)  .78 (Hubbardston)  .49 (Worcester) 
Berkshire  1786  .82 (.05)  .92 (New Ashford)  .71 (Windsor) 
1801  .75 (.05)  .86 (Southfield)  .67 (Pittsfield & 
Stockbridge) 
Suffol  IdNorfolk  1786  .71 (.lo)  .91 (Chelsea)  .52 (Hingham) 
1801  .61 (.lo)  .46 (Chelsea)  .44  (Hingham) 
Essex  1786  .55 (.22)  .76 (Lynnfield)  .03 Newburyport 
1801  .47 (.24)  .69 (Lynnfield)  .01 Newburyport 
Middlesex  1786  .71 (.  17)  .80 (Hopkinton)  .39 (Medford) 
1801  .66 (.I 1)  .79 (Boxborough)  .19 (Charlestown) 
Plymouth  1786  .70 (.12)  .91 (Kingston)  .39 (Plymouth) 
1801  .56 (.15)  .78 (Halifax)  .20 (Plymouth) 
Bristol  1786  .78 (.08)  .93 (Freetown)  .61 (Taunton) 
1801  .61 (.12)  .52 (Freetown)  .29 (New Bedford) 
Source: Calculated from Town Tax Valuation Lists, 1786, 1801, Massachusetts State Archives. 
Notes:  Standard deviations  are in parentheses.  Taxes on agriculture  are the sum of  taxes on 
tillage, mowing, meadow and marsh, pasture, woodlands, and livestock. 
’Boston and Salem, as in all these tables, are excluded from “all towns.” 
County) moved from paying 93 percent of taxes in 1786 to paying just over 
50 percent; and in Kingston (Plymouth County) agriculture moved from pay- 
ing over 90 percent of taxes in 1786 to just over 30 percent fifteen years later. 
Stock in trade is of course only one index of commercialization,  but it de- 
serves special attention. It is the measure of  inventory investment in the era 
before GNP accounting, measuring as it does the value of tools and goods in 
process found in artisanal shops  ,41  and the magnitude of merchandise stocks 
in retail and wholesale shops. Shops and stores occupy places in a dendritic 
41. A considerable literature is emerging on the transitional role played by artisanal shops in 
the industrialization of  southern New England.  Deeply rooted as they were in traditional rural 
society, they occupied a place on a continuum between farm and factory-part  farmers, part 
craftsmen, part industrial  worker.  Shadrach Steere, a woodworker who made bobbins for the 
Slater mills in Rhode Island,  continued  to farm all his life.  His farm protected him from the 
vicissitudes facing the urban artisan, while his craft protected him from the risks confronting New 
England farmers in the early nineteenth century (Sokoloff 1984, 351-82;  Cooper 1987). I draw 
the reader’s attention to the following as yet unpublished papers written for conferences at Old 
Sturbridge Village: Carolyn Cooper and Patrick Malone, “The Mechanical Woodworker in Early 
nineteenth Century New England as a Spin-off from Textile Industrialization” (1990); Robert B. 
Gordon, “Edge Tools in Context” (1990); Martha Lance, “Upper Quinebaug Mill Survey: Testing 
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marketing  When, around 1800, the little inland town of Shrews- 
bury found a market in Boston-ninety  miles away-for  its cheese, butter, 
chickens, veal, pork, and hay and in Brighton for its cattle, it was in large 
measure because Artemas Ward’s General Store was a node in a proliferating 
network of symbiotic enterprises stretching from Worcester County to Boston 
along the two that ran through Shrewsbury. Stores, and peddlers as well, not 
only expanded the marketing perimeters of farmers qua suppliers, but played 
an important role in fashioning among farm families a demand for store- 
bought goods the insatiability of which may very well have been one of the 
“kicks” that got agriculture moving.43 
Market-led productivity growth is a harsh process, one that produces both 
winners and losers. Presumably the towns in table 7.5 that lay on the yonder 
edge of  developmental change, the towns that by  1801 still derived 70, 80, or 
90  percent of their taxable wealth from farming, were among the losers. Per- 
haps the most politically significant group of  losers in Massachusetts history 
were the followers of Daniel Shays, whose rebellion affords an opportunity to 
explore the economic contours of  what is for me one of  its most resonant 
attributes: the fact that it happened in 1786, annus mirabilis in the time path 
of  rural market integration and agricultural productivity growth. Can differ- 
ential access to the emerging market economy, and to the differential agricul- 
tural productivity growth that was its consequence, explain why some Mas- 
sachusetts towns supported the insurrection, others supported the state, and 
still others produced leaders for both sides? 
Table 7.6  relates proxy measures of  agricultural productivity in  “Shays 
country” to town sympathies in the rebellion.44  While we are fortunate to have 
a tax valuation exactly contemporaneous with the event, two serious obstacles 
inhere in this source. First, because the 1786 valuations are aggregated to the 
town level, we are compelled to aggregate our two variables-both  of which 
42. On the importance of distribution networks in the growth of consumer demand, and the role 
that proliferating retail shops played in those networks, see Shammas (1990, 225-90). 
43. “Peddlers were central to this process of creating a market structure in ante-bellum America 
. . . . They inaugurated a commercial revolution which swept away the village culture which had 
nourished them leaving us with some of their products and a rich folklore. Rural residents were 
less concerned with resisting the intrusion of capitalism than with articulating their own mode of 
indigenous commercialization. Peddlers were a part of this articulation as much as were farm- 
ers-their  roles were different but they were part of the same world-a  world which they were 
both unintentionally destroying” (Jaffee 1990). 
44. I owe my attribution of town sympathies in the rebellion to Brooke (1992). Brooke deter- 
mines the allegiance  of  towns in the three western counties on the basis of  warrants,  arrests, 
indictments, imprisonments, the Hampshire County Black List, and lists of  militia leaders. 
See also Marini (1986), who uses church histories, minutes of Baptist and Presbyterian associa- 
tions, and sermons to characterize the town by characterizing its minister and his relation to his 
congregation. Marini also extends his analysis to the pockets of Shaysite sympathy in the eastern 
counties of Bristol and Middlesex. 
Brooke has a sophisticated social-history (as distinguished from economic-history) interpreta- 
tion of the rebellion in his Heart of  the Commonwealth (1989, chap. 7). 332  Winifred B. Rothenberg 
Bble 7.6  Comparing Towns Supporting  and Opposing Shays’s Rebellion with 
Respect to Selected Agricultural Productivity Proxies 
Shaysite  Militia & 
Conflicted 
~~  ~~____ 
No. of polls  206  257 
No. of  barns  75  103 
Tillage (acres)  673  938 
Tillage assessment = acres x tax rate (%)  855  1,243 
Mowing tax rate ($)  1.51  1.63 
Meadow (acres)  342  669 
Meadow tax rate ($)  0.85  0.91 
Meadow assessment = acres X  tax rate ($)  297  61 I 
Pasture (acres)  1,177  1,611 
Cider (barrels)  336  700 
No. of  head of livestock  1,320  1,589 
Livestock assessment = no. head  X  tax rate ($)  76  1 
Money on hand ($)  77  135 
Debts ($9  438  2,151 
Stock in trade ($)  259  1,176 
Total tax (%)  4,948  6,934 
Aggregate taxes on agriculture ($)  3,380  4,685 
592 
Source:  Town Tax Valuation Lists, 1786, Massachusetts State Archives. 
Nores: The 128 towns in “Shays Country” (the three western counties of Massachusetts in 1786) 
were partitioned into two groups according to the measures of  allegiance cited in n. 44.  For each 
category enumerated in the 1786  valuations, group means were calculated. The categories shown 
in this table are those for which the difference between the means is significant at the <.05  level 
(with the exception of  number of  head of  livestock, where the difference between means was 
significant at the .09 level). 
are, after all, decisions made on the individual level-to  the town level. We 
are forced to say that the rown has or does not have Shaysite sympathies, that 
the town  is or is not realizing increases in farm labor productivity. The second 
major problem is the failure of the 1786 valuations to enumerate any outputs 
(except cider). This, of course, seriously compromises our efforts to generate 
productivity estimates. Lacking any alternative, 1  am compelled to argue that 
the striking variance in tax rates on land in the same use in different towns, 
and on lands in different uses in the same town, can serve as a proxy for the 
differential income-earning capacity of these lands. 
The experimental design consists of  testing, with respect to each of  the 
taxable magnitudes in the valuations, the differences between the means and 
the variances of two groups of towns: those with Shaysite sympathies, on one 
hand, and on the ofher, those opposed, either because they supported the state 
militia or because they produced leaders for both sides. The magnitudes in the 
1786 valuation that are not included in table 7.6 are those for which the means 
between the two groups of  towns were not significantly different from one 
another at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 7.7  %o-Way  Contingency Tables Relating Shaysite Sympathy to 
Agricultural Productivity Proxies 
Agricultural  Agriculture/ 
Total Tax  Taxes  Total Tax 
0  1  0  1  0  1 
Anti-Shays towns  31  44  33  42  32  43 
Pro-Shays towns  26  8  26  8  21  13 
Significance  level  .001  .002  .06 
Chi square  11.6  9.9  3.4 
Sources:  Town  Tax  Valuation List,  1786, Massachusetts  State Archives, for the  128 western 
towns in “Shays Country.” For attribution of town sympathies see sources at n. 44. 
Note: “Anti-Shays towns”  are those that supported the state militia and conflicted towns that 
produced leaders for both sides. “Agricultural taxes” are the assessments on tillage, grasslands, 
and livestock. “Agriculture/total tax” is the share of  total assessments paid by  taxes on agricul- 
ture. 
towns by  the frequency with which each group of  towns fell above (1) or 
below (0) the mean of all 128 western towns in “Shays country” with respect 
to selected items in the 1786 valuation. The chi-square test results allow us to 
assert that the two groups of  towns were significantly different from one an- 
other with respect to three proxy measures of the performance of agriculture. 
Shaysite towns lay significantly below the mean (O),  and non-Shaysite (mi- 
litia and conflicted) towns lay significantly above the mean (1) with respect to 
total taxes assessed, the assessment on agricultural property, and the propor- 
tion of the tax paid by agricultural property. In other words, the towns that did 
not throw their lot in with the insurrection had significantly more prosperous 
agricultural enterprises than  did  the  towns  supporting the  insurrection.” 
Given the intractabilities in the data referred to earlier, I interpret these results 
as confirming my  surmise that whatever its significance as an event in anti- 
Federalist politics or democratic populism, Shays’s Rebellion seems now to 
loom as a deeply conservative impulse, a fist shaken at impending change. 
The danger to the Shaysites came not from the “competitive capitalism of 
merchants,”* but from within the farm economy, poised, as it was quite liter- 
ally in 1786, on the cusp of structural transformation. 
Shays’s Rebellion serves to illustrate the serious political consequences of 
uneven rural development, but my purpose in introducing this material at this 
time is to use the association confirmed in tables 7.6 and 7.7, between the 
45. This does not contradict the discussion on pp.  329-31  measuring economic development 
by a decline over time in the proportion of total taxes paid by the agricultural sector. Recall that 
the movement out of agriculture has to do with the shift between 1786 and 1801, whereas this 
analysis of what we may call the economic origins of  Shaysite sympathies has to do with the 
towns’ relative status at a point in time, in 1786. 
46. This is the view of David P.  Szatmary (1980) and others who see the rebellion as an agrarian 
defense of the moral economy against merchant capitalism. I am suggesting that the enemy they 
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political polarities in 1786 and agricultural productivity measures, to reverse 
the direction of the inquiry. Having run a causal chain from agricultural im- 
provement to partisanship in the insurrection, I propose now to run the chain 
backward, from partisanship in the insurrection to agricultural improvement, 
in order to suggest which towns may be presumed to have had access to the 
market in 1786 and which did not. Since the argument sounds circular, let me 
schematize it. There are three propositions here: A is a proposition about pro- 
ductivity; B is a proposition about market access; and C is a proposition about 
sympathies in the insurrection. I consider the link between A and C to have 
been demonstrated by  the results in tables 7.6 and 7.7. I consider the link 
between A and B to have been demonstrated many times over in my published 
work. If C and B are both linked to A, then they are linked to each other, and 
allegiance can be used as presumptive evidence of market access, or the lack 
of it. 
I suggest, then, that of the 128 towns in the western counties, the 34 towns 
loyal to the rebels were probably “locked out” of access to markets in 1786; 
and that the 75 anti-Shays towns, in addition to those that remained hors de 
combat, were in varying degrees “locked in ” to a market economy, had in 
varying degrees embraced, as it were, the new dispensation, and were, by 
1786, enjoying its consequences for productivity growth. 
I have focused deliberately in this paper on a very narrow period-one  I 
had elsewhere identified as a turning point in farm labor productivity-a  point 
in time too narrow, I had feared, to register in the behavior of lumpy aggre- 
gates. But I submit that in this analysis, based principally on town tax valua- 
tions of 1771, 1786, 1792, and 1801, the turning point stands confirmed. 
We  might still ask, why? Why did the productivity turnaround happen at 
the end of the eighteenth century? Why did farmers choose that time to re- 
spond to market signals in a new way? Questions of  that kind, if  they have 
any answer at all, tend to have a great many answers. One was suggested at 
the beginning of this paper: the process may have begun as a Smithian feed- 
back loop in which falling real wages, increased output, extended markets, 
and division of labor worked together to generate more of the same. But if so, 
that process was apparently embedded in a far more profound one: a change 
in climate regimes. The market-led transformation of Massachusetts agricul- 
ture was set against a major regional climate shift between 1750 and 1850. 
And the two phenomena, I suggest, may not have been unrelated. Confronted 
by a long transitional regime of hazardously unpredictable weather, reorganiz- 
ing the farm to achieve total factor productivity growth may have been per- 
ceived as the only way to succeed by farming. 
Weather happens both on a scale so large that we can speak of a “global 
climate” and on a scale so small that places a mile apart can have different 
“weathers.” But that it is important to agriculture, even if  not decisively so, 
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without saying!) Extremely important work on New England’s climate history 
and its relationship to agricultural change is being done now, and the results, 
however preliminary, may cast light on dating the transformation of  Massa- 
chusetts agri~ulture.~~ 
The years 1750-1850  are identified by climate historian William R. Baron 
as a “change-over” period, an interval caught in the shift from one major cli- 
matic regime to another. The earlier regime, called the neoglacial, was “a time 
of somewhat cooler temperatures, prominent polar anticyclones, southwardly 
displaced depression tracts, and considerable  blocking of upper winds by high 
pressure cells over Iceland and the northeastern Atlantic .” The later regime 
was a “very different” pattern of warmer and more stable weather. Seventeen 
fifty to eighteen fifty, like all such transitional periods, was marked by great 
instability, by heightened variability in all the relevant parameters: in “grow- 
ing season length, storm frequencies, snowfall, droughts, and harsh and un- 
usual weather” (Baron 1990, 1). From the point of view of the farmer, it is 
this variability in the weather, far more than the weather itself, that increases 
his risks and endangers his enterprise. And risk there was: in thirteen out of 
the twenty-four years-more  than half-between  1750 and 1774, there ap- 
pear to have been too few “growing degree days” in Cambridge, Massachu- 
setts, for the corn to mature at all.48  The most extreme instance of eccentric 
weather was 1815, which had the longest growing season by far-240  days 
between killing frosts!-of  any year between  1750 and  1970, followed the 
very next year,  1816, by  the so-called year without a summer, which had  a 
growing season of only 80 days, by far the shortest.49  For any one year during 
the eighteenth century, a Massachusetts farmer could anticipate that the last 
killing frost before spring planting could happen anytime between the elev- 
enth of March and the fourteenth of June; and that the first killing frost in the 
fall (which would destroy at least half his crop) could come anytime between 
the twenty ninth of August and the seventeenth of  November (Baron 1984, 
318). 
Risks on this scale-uninsurable,  random, devastating-dwarf  the risks of 
producing for market. Confronted by  a Nature that must certainly have  ap- 
peared to play dice with the Universe, production for market becomes a risk- 
aversive strategy. And  in  1801, it must really  have looked as though the 
enhanced yields, changes in output mix, intensified use of labor, spatial reo- 
47. In the discussion of climate and weather to follow, I shall be  summarizing, to the best of my 
ability, the work of William R. Baron, supervisor of the Historical Climate Records Office, North- 
em Arizona University, Flagstaff, Arizona 86011, and colleagues (Baron 1982a, 1982b, 1984, 
1985, 1989, and 1990). I am  deeply indebted to Prof. Baron for generously sharing his extraordi- 
nary work with me. 
48. This is how I interpret Baron (1989, fig 1, p. 21). 
49. The length of the growing season is one of the variables that can be  expected to affect yields. 
It may therefore be  relevant to the agricultural magnitudes in the valuations used in this study. At 
212 days, 1771 had the longest growing season, save for the extraordinary summer of 1815; 1786 
had 152 days; 1801 had 190 days. 336  Winifred B. Rothenberg 
rientation of farm functions, shift of capital out of  agriculture, and perceptible 
gains in  total factor productivity-all  achieved under the aegis of  the mar- 
ket-would  indeed save Massachusetts  agriculture. 
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COInmeIlt  Jeremy Atack 
Writing in  1916, Percy Bidwell advanced what was then, or, certainly, what 
was to become, the conventional wisdom regarding New England agriculture 
at the start of the nineteenth century: 
it was  most  inefficiently, and, to  all  appearances, carelessly conducted. 
Very  little improvement had been made over the primitive methods em- 
ployed by the earliest settlers. As soon as the pioneer stage had passed and 
the clearing of the land had been accomplished, the colonists settled down 
to a routine husbandry, based largely on the knowledge and practices of 
English farmers of the early seventeenth century, but in many ways much 
less advanced than the agriculture of the motherland even at that early date 
. . . improvements of far-reaching significance had been introduced in En- 
glish agriculture . . .  yet the bulk of the farmers had shown no disposition 
to adopt the new methods. On their poorly cultivated fields little fertilizer 
of any sort was used, their implements were rough and clumsy, live stock 
was neglected, and the same grains and vegetables were raised year after 
year with little attempt at a rotation of crops, until the land was exhausted. 
(1916, 319) 
This view has become so entrenched in our consciousness that it permeates 
the currently popular texts in economic history and is central to most models 
of  U.S.  regional specialization and development.  I  Surprisingly, it  has also 
managed to avoid critical scrutiny for decades. Just as well-for  it now ap- 
pears to rest upon very shaky ground. Indeed, such views are no longer ten- 
able, thanks in large part to the work of one scholar-Winifred  Rothenberg. 
Over the past fifteen years or so, she has assembled a large body of  evi- 
dence from primary sources, both qualitative and quantitative, bearing on the 
condition of agriculture in the quintessential New England state-Massachu- 
setts-between  the late colonial period and the mid-nineteenth century. This 
evidence from farm account books, county records, and the like, her weaving 
of a coherent, consistent narrative theme, and her careful analysis of the quan- 
titative data lead inescapably to the conclusion that farmers in Massachusetts, 
at least, were engaged in market production throughout the period, were re- 
sponsive to market signals,  mobilized capital,  and were willing to change 
habits when the incentives were right.* 
Rothenberg's paper here draws heavily upon her published work, especially 
her study of the farm labor market (1988). The crucial finding there was that 
Jeremy Atack is professor of economics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign  and 
a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. This comment is on the paper 
as delivered at the conference. 
1. For examples of this conventional wisdom in current American economic history texts, see 
Hughes (1990, 32-33)  or Walton and Rockoff (1990,49-50,  89). The best-known model of re- 
gional specialization  and development in the United States during the nineteenth century is that of 
Douglas North. See North (1961, 1966). See also Field (1978). 
2. Market production and responsiveness to market signals: Rothenberg (1981). Capital mar- 
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labor productivity, as measured by  the farm labor wage rate deflated by  a 
wage-good price index-actually  Rothenberg’s own farm-gate price index 
(1979)-was  declining until about 1780 and rising from sometime after 1790 
until perhaps the 1830s or 1840s (Rothenberg 1988, 558, figure 4). It is this 
result that Rothenberg seeks to buttress here. 
The evidence she presents is in three forms. First, she finds evidence of 
increasing specialization in crops with higher labor value-added such as dairy 
products and hay. Second, she presents evidence showing that Massachusetts 
farmers changed the organization of  farm labor. Third, she concludes that 
yields per acre were rising. However, as I shall explain below, each of these 
pieces of evidence, whether in isolation or together, fails to make a cast-iron 
case that labor productivity was rising at an average annual rate as high as 0.5 
percent (Rothenberg 1988, 559n.35). This rate of growth is almost certainly 
biased upwards. 
Nevertheless, I am unwilling to reject her conclusion that labor productivity 
was rising, if only because it is consistent with a growing body of  evidence 
from other parts of the country about this time. For example, Ball and Walton 
find that there was very modest growth in total factor productivity in Chester 
County, Pennsylvania, agriculture before the Revolution, a slight setback dur- 
ing, and a modest resumption of growth immediately following the Revolu- 
tion (1976, especially 110). Similarly, Adams’s work on wages and prices in 
Maryland with commodity-deflated wage rates indexed to the 1780s implies 
rising labor productivity after that date (1986, especially 638, table 5). For 
the country as a whole, Gallman concludes that labor productivity in corn, 
oats, and wheat grew at about 0.3 percent per year between 1800 and 1850 
(Gallman 1975, especially 47). 
The crux of  my critique derives from her use of  the labor productivity de- 
fined as output, Q,  per unit of labor input, L: 
qL = QJL 
Data constraints and  the existence of  multiple outputs, however, generally 
lead-as  they do here-to  the measurement of output by the aggregate value 
of output, that is Q is proxied by 
C  QPi 
where Qi  is the output of the ith crop that sells for price Pi. 
The obvious problem here is that price changes, driven by demand, may be 
confused with changes in physical output in this measure. But, we may be 
doubly sure that this is not the case here, for not only is Rothenberg’s price 
index for farm products in Massachusetts  but it is also for farm-gate prices- 
that is, it removes the effect of impact in transportation and distribution cost 
changes. Prices and price expectations, however, do play a crucial role in the 
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enberg’s argument is  that  Massachusetts farmers adopted higher revenue- 
producing crops and that this led to increased productivity. It seems unlikely 
that this technological shift identified by  Rothenberg was  an illusion even 
though much of the evidence is drawn from tax valuations. 
Leaving aside the philosophical question of the impact of this implicit de- 
viation  from  profit maximization  upon  productivity, the  question is,  why 
didn’t farmers adopt the higher revenue-producing crop mix earlier? The an- 
swer is not that this option did not exist before: farmers were quite familiar 
with dairy and hay production long before they practiced them to the extent 
that they came to. Indeed, it was probably because they were familiar with 
these crops that they did not adopt them earlier! Although these crops pro- 
duced higher revenues, they required greater effort. They are examples of 
Boserupian-innovations (Boserup  1965). Reluctance  to  put  forth  this  in- 
creased effort then delays adoption until economic or physical survival makes 
it a matter of  necessity. This issue thus bears upon the first two pieces of 
evidence used by Rothenberg. 
The problem with this kind of technological change is easiest to see in the 
case of dairy production. The dairy demands year-round attention, twice-a- 
day milking, not to mention the cleaning of  the milking shed, cooling the 
milk, churning, and so forth, and it also goes hand-in-hand with intensive stall 
feeding of hays and root crops, themselves more labor-intensive crops (see, 
for example, Bateman  1969). This intensification of  effort-measured  by 
more work effort per hour, increased hours per day, and more workdays per 
year-should,  of  course, be captured in the measure of labor input, L. The 
question, though, is, Is it? 
I am not convinced that it is. Rothenberg’s evidence pertains to labor con- 
tract terms and daily wages, not work intensity and man-hours. Are six one- 
month contracts the same quantity of labor as one six-month contract? I don’t 
know, but I suspect not. One reason why is that rational employers would seek 
to retain the better worker by offering more attractive-such  as longer-con- 
tract terms. Longer, and more frequent long-term, contracts are consistent 
with increased labor requirements throughout the year, and higher daily wages 
are consistent with either greater productivity or longer hours and greater ef- 
fort. What is not mentioned is what happens to the farmer’s own labor and 
that of  unpaid family members, particularly his wife. Ideally what I would 
like to see is an accounting of labor hours by task (such as those reported for 
grain crops by Parker and Klein, 1966 later in the nineteenth century) for all 
paid  and unpaid labor, including that of the farmer and that bound to the 
farmer by  affection, filial devotion, or whatever and how this changes over 
time. If  the necessary contemporary data do not exist in farmers’ daybooks, 
the periodical literature, travelogues, and the like, perhaps time and motion 
studies at historic farm museums such as Old Sturbridge Village will offer 
some insight. 
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productivity was rising is that yields per acre were rising. If all land was cur- 
rently under cultivation and remained in crops, increased yields necessarily 
imply increased output and hence higher labor productivity ceteris paribus: 
1 
where Ai  is acreage planted in the ith crop so that QJAi is the yield per acre for 
this ith crop. The evidence here, though, is very tenuous, being just for two 
year,  1771 and  1801. Nothing is said about conditions in  these two years, 
though presumably some newspaper accounts of general weather conditions, 
the state of the harvest, and so forth, might be found. Even so, though, yield 
estimates contain large stochastic elements reflecting local weather variations 
that swamp any short, or even medium, -term trend. Indeed, yields show tre- 
mendous variations from farm to farm, township to township, year to year 
that a much, much longer run of data is needed before any broad sweeping 
statement is warranted. 
Finally, while I am very sympathetic to the argument that Massachusetts 
agriculture was much less backward than the conventional wisdom has argued 
and believe that Rothenberg’s evidence clinches the case, this paper contrib- 
utes relatively little to this broader question. Although it starts out addressing 
the question of  whether or not the real farm wage-farm labor productivity 
nexus holds and farm labor productivity was rising from the 1790s, its focus 
is actually upon a much narrower time frame from the late 1770s to the early 
1780s-a  period when fluctuations about the long-term trend are largest and 
the trend itself is obscured-with  data that are themselves widely separated 
discrete observations. 
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